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Man 0 War Restaurants, Inc. v. Martin:
Law Altering Economic Performance
BY JONATHAN M. SKEETERS*
INTRODUCTION
cholarship has been intrigued with the interplay of law and
economics since the revolutionary writings of Adam Smith'
began circulation in 1776. However, modem scholastic dis-
course in law and economics is credited to Ronald Coase, Guido Calabresi,
Henry Manne, andRichard Posner.2 Posner3 and his disciples espouse ideas
* J.D., M.B.A. expected 2000, University of Kentucky.
'Adam Smith (1723-1790) wrote and lectured on a variety of subjects, but is
most well known for his 1776 treatise entitled An Inquiry Into the Nature and
Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Smith is recognized for his illustration of the
economic relations in market societies.
In one way or another Adam Smith remains a central figure in the law and
economics movement. More than 200 years after the publication of the
Wealth of Nations he remains the key philosophical reference point from
which most economists seek validation or distinguishment. Nowhere is this
more true than in the evolution in legal theory brought on by the emergence
of law and economics as a legitimate subdiscipline. For within the realm of
discourse and disputes concerning the allocation of scarce resources and
political power there are a number of influential scholars that invoke Smith
or his ideas as reference points for their own work.
Robin Paul Malloy, Adam Smith and theModernDiscourse ofLawandEconomics,
in ADAM SMITH AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 113 (Robin Paul
Malloy & Jerry Evensky eds., 1994).
2 
"Coase, Calabresi, Manne, and Posnerwere honored as the 'four founders' of
law and economics at the Plenary Session of the American Law and Economics
Association on 24 May 1991." NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA,
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 193 n. 1 (1997).
3 Richard A. Posner, born in 1939, is a noted federal judge, lecturer, and
author. He received a Bachelor ofArts degree in English from Yale in 1959
and a law degree from Harvard in 1962. He clerked for Justice Brennan of
the U.S. Supreme Court from 1962 to 1963, was an assistant to the
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of economic principles describing human behavior, rational self-interest,
and efficiency as a guide in decision-making.4 For their efforts, critics have
accused them of "building theory upon theory"' and using "proselytizing
efforts' 6 to attract "[s]cholars disenchanted with big government' 7 in an
attempt to justify their logic.
Despite the criticism, the legal system is slowly accepting and
incorporating the combination of law and economics. The science of
economics can be applied to the entire spectrum of jurisprudence.
Economic analysis of the law has the potential to become an important
discipline, as it has already been exercised in contract law, tort law,
criminal law, family law, and even in the legal policy towards AIDS.'
Nevertheless, arecent opinion issuedbythe Kentucky Supreme Court, Man
0 War Restaurants, Inc. v. Martin,9 failed to apply the logic of law and
economics and has endangered the future economic well-being of
Kentucky.
Mainstream law and economics operates within three main assump-
tions. First, all humans are economically rational.'0 Second, human
relations are equivalent to market exchanges.' Third, markets are the best
social institutions in that they are self-correcting. 2 However, before
Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission from 1963 to 1965, and
was Assistant to the Solicitor General from 1965 to 1967, and General
Counsel to the Presidential Task Force on Communications Policy from
1967 to 1968. He then served as an Associate Professor at Stanford
University Law School from 1968 to 1969 and Professor at the University
of Chicago Law School from 1969 to 1981. He became a circuit judge on
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 1981 where
he continues to serve. He has written extensively in support of Law and
Economics.
Robert C. Downs, Law and Economics: Nexus ofScience and Belief, 27 PAc. L.J.
1, 9 n.35 (1995).
4 See MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 2, at 57.
' Downs, supra note 3, at 35.
6 Id.
7d.
8Seegenerally Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of
the Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 433; Downs, supra note 3, at 9.
9 Man 0 War Restaurants, Inc. v. Martin, 932 S.W.2d 366 (Ky. 1996).
10 See generally MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 2, at 57-60 (describing the
foundational theory behind what many scholars believe to be the basic elements of
the "classic" approach to law and economics).
1 See id.
12 See id.
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decision makers can apply the theories behind law and economics, they
must first understand its logic.
Part I of this Note establishes the framework from which decision
makers can perform an economic analysis of the law. 3 By becoming aware
of the cause and effect relationship between changes in law and economic
performance, grasping the necessary assumptions, and understanding the
central theory, decision makers will have a baseline from which to create
efficient legal rules. Part H outlines the Man 0 War decision and the
court's preference for creating an equitable rule over an efficient rule. 4
Part I examines stock repurchase provisions with a view towards judicial
authority and the economic logic behind the decisions pronouncing the
majority rule.15 Part IV addresses the future implications of the Man 0 War
decision, focusing on the potential problems it will cause for Kentucky and
proposing possible solutions and corrective measures that could be taken
to foster meaningful economic activity.' 6
I. FRAMEWORK FOR AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
A. General Premise
The United States is a mixed-market economy 7 comprised of a private
sector, public sector, and a communal sector. 8 These three distinct sectors
each possess their own unique legal rights. However, "[t]he scope and
character of each of these sectors is contingent upon the extant legal
relations governing [our] society."' 9 Moreover, the reality of each sector
creates an integrated mix of legal relations that "directly affect the
economic performance of the mixed-market economy, specifically, the
economic performance in the economy's private sector, its public sector,
and its communal sector."'2
'3 See infra notes 17-50 and accompanying text.
"4 See infra notes 51-79 and accompanying text.
'5 See infra notes 80-131 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 132-153 and accompanying text.
17 BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS TERMS 363 (1987) [hereinafter DIC-
TIONARY OF BUSINESS TERMS] ("[An] economy in which both market forces and
government intervention and direction are used to determine resource allocation
and prices.").
18 See MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 2, at 22.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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The very nature of the mixed-market economy is such that changes in
the legal rights of one sector create a reaction in the other sectors that
produces an overall alteration in human behavior.
Altering the Law, that is changing the legal relations governing society in
any one or all of the three sectors, or changing the working rules, will
ultimately alter economic performance. Thus, the logic underlying Law
and Economics suggests the following line of reasoning: Change the legal
relations governing society and/or its working rules and you will
ultimately and systematically affect economic performance.2'
Working from this premise, if the law is changed, the logic of law
and economics predicts the following chain of events: first, incentives
will be altered, then, behavior of individuals will be altered, and finally,
the economic performance of the mixed-market economy will be altered.'
It follows that when the judicial system creates bad law, bad economic
outcomes will follow. The causal relationship between legal rules and
economic performance cannot be ignored. Decision makers must be aware
of the consequences that legal rules have upon human behavior in market
transactions. Laws have the ability to constrain economic activity by
extinguishing the incentives for individuals and entities alike to behave in
ways that will positively impact the economy. On the other hand, laws can
increase the incentives for action and thereby enhance economic activity.
It is the responsibility of decision makers to ensure the latter results.
B. Requisite Assumptions
While it may be true that "all important human values [cannot] be
reduced to supply and demand curves,"' there are certain assumptions
about human behavior that are employed in the economic analysis of law.
The following is a framework for the study of law based on economic
principles and human behavior:
a. Individual consumers can get access to good information;
b. Individuals know what they want;
c. Individuals can take cues generated by the market;
21 Id.
See id.
2 Downs, supra note 3, at 35.
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d. The market does not care about the issue of fairness and justice.
Allocation of scarce resources is made on "votes of dollars." The market
leaves it to society to provide equal opportunity;
e. The market will price whatever product or issue is under consider-
ation;
f. There is a certain degree of competition in that there are multiple
buyers and sellers;
g. People and resources are freely moveable;
h. There is acceptance of the current distribution of income and
resources;
i. The supply and demand theories, and the graph curves which
represent them, are substantially correct;
j. The corollary to the supply and demand theories is also true, that
as the price (cost) of a thing increases. its demand (utilization) will
decrease;
k. Efficiency is understood to mean the acquisition of a thing
(including products, rights, etc.) by the person who values it most;
I. Efficiency is a worthy objective;
m. Rules of law (whether judicially or legislatively defimed) should
encourage people toward efficient behavior;
n. Regardless of which rule of law is applicable... the parties will,
in the absence of transaction costs, reach the same solution to their
problem, and that solution will be efficient; and
o. There is no fundamental right or wrong to... conflicts, since each
party may be properly characterized as imposing costs upon the other.24
Although classified as assumptions, the above list is a valid illustration
of the relationship between economic principles and human behavior.
People know what they want and are able to use market mechanisms to
achieve their desires. The market always provides a price for exchanges by
facilitating an arena where buyers and sellers can openly negotiate for
goods and services. Furthermore, advancing efficient markets within which
to operate will generate productive exchanges that improve the lives of all
humans.
Law and economic scholarship draws on these assumptions to
formulate its theories and underlying principles. However, these so-called
assumptions are played out everyday in a capitalist society, and as they
become more recognized by the legal profession, society will be rewarded
by increased economic performance.
241d. at 12-13.
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C. Central Theory
Operating within this framework, it is obvious that economics is not
reserved to the study of supply and demand, unemployment, price
elasticity,25 inflation, interest rates, or the comparison of firms operating in
an oligopoly 26 to those in perfect competition. 27 Rather, economics is "the
science of rational choice in a world-our world--in which resources are
limited in relation to human wants. 28
The concept of rational choice is the central theory in the arena of law
and economics scholarship. At the core of this theory is the assumption that
every human is a rational maximizer of his or her ends. Thus, people act in
their self-interest and will rationally choose the best means to their chosen
ends. Based on the requisite assumptions of economics and human
behavior, people have the ability to process information and form
preferences. To achieve these preferences, people "compute the cost and
benefits of alternative courses of action '2 9 and then choose the action that
maximizes their return. Conversely, people will choose not to act where the
cost/benefit analysis reveals no benefit or too little benefit to satisfy the
actor.
Skeptics of rational choice theory predict that humans will not always
act in a rational sense to maximize their self-interest in non-market
settings. 30 However, whether in market transactions or non-market
'The relationship between the total amount spent on a good in the market
and the price of the good. It is the percentage change in quantity divided by
the percentage change in price. If a price decrease results in larger total
expenditure (and vice versa), the good is price elastic. If a price results in
less total expenditure (or vice versa), the good is price inelastic.
DICTIONARY OF BusiNEss TERMS, supra note 17, at 446.26 
"An industry in which a few large sellers of similar products, such as auto-
mobiles, dominate the market." Id. at 395.
27A market condition wherein no buyer or seller has the power to alter the
market price of a good or service. Characteristics ofa perfectly competitive
market are a large number of buyers and sellers, a homogenous (similar)
good or service, an equal awareness of prices and volume, an absence of
discrimination in buying and selling, total mobility ofproductive resources,
and complete freedom of entry. Perfect competition exists only as a
theoretical ideal.
Id. at 425-26.
2 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (1992).29 Ulen, supra note 8, at 457.
31 See generally id.; Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
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transactions, as long as the transaction is at arm's length, human behavior
predicts that all possible outcomes will be gauged and the one that
maximizes the chooser's utility will be chosen.
The concept that humans are rational maximizers of their self-interest
"implies that people respond to incentives."' Certainly then, when people
are presented with the right incentives, they will act rationally and choose
what is the best outcome for them, thus promoting efficient exchanges.
D. Creating Efficient Legal Rules
Law and economics has developed into a useful tool to "predict the
consequences of various legal rules." '32 With this in mind, decision makers
must analyze the end result of their decisions. Will their decision promote
efficiency, thereby maximizing wealth, or will their decision promote
equity, thereby creating fairness? Overall, "[d]eciding which legal rule to
adopt will depend (in part) on which social goal or goals the legal
policymaker deems important." '33
Efficiency as defined in a law and economics sense is embodied in the
phrase "wealth maximization." Wealth maximization occurs when "the
gains to the winners exceed the losses to the losers."'34 A legal change
promotes efficiency "if the wealth of society (as measured by willingness
to pay) is increased!" such that people can be made better off without
making other people worse off. Thus, the "economic task from the
perspective of wealth maximization... is to influence [individuals] so as
to maximize [their] output. 36
Equity is, in economic jargon, concerned with the distribution of
income among individuals based on justice and fairness. That is to say that
if "efficiency corresponds to 'the size of the pie' ... equity has to do with
how it is sliced."37 The principles of justice and fairness have been the
cornerstones of law since its conception. The concept of equity, when
3' POSNER, supra note 28, at 4.32 Thomas F. Cotter, LegalPragmatism andtheLaw andEconomicsMovement,
84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2099 (1996).33 Id. at 2104.
34 M ERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 2, at 59.
35 Id.
36 Id. (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 382
(1990)).
37 A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7
(1983).
1999-20001 ,
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discussed in law and economics, focuses on "questions of distribution
under the guise of legal doctrines built on the precepts of justice and
fairness." '3 Equity is no more than a "social comparison" '39 whereby
"people compare the ratio of their 'outcomes' to 'inputs' with the same
ratio for others."
The problem with valuing equity over efficiency is that "in the real
world the equitable result may depart from the efficient result."'" In fact,
"equity can be attained more effectively if the courts and legislature adopt
efficient legal rules."'42  By implementing rules that promote
efficiency-i.e., wealth maximization-the judiciary and legislature can
increase the pool from which to draw tax revenue and thereby increase the
amount of wealth redistribution. 43
Focusing on wealth maximization through efficient legal rules permits
efficient exchanges and maintains a "'fair' net increase in utility for each
party so as to prevent disproportionate gains by the stronger marketplace
participants." In other words, efficient legal rules allow the "pie" to grow
larger, giving everyone a bigger piece and making society as a whole better
off. In addition, efficient legal rules promote exchanges and facilitate the
spread of wealth.45
Society benefits from an "open, accessible marketplace" because it
"allows citizens to imagine, create, produce, distribute, exchange, and share
scarce resources."'7 This free market exchange produces the profits
necessary "to pay taxes that pay benefits and provide services, such as
medical care, for those unable to pay for them."'48
This is as it should be. A society based strictly on legal rules of equity
would be in direct conflict with natural market forces and produce
counterproductive outcomes. In fact, a society using only equitable legal
rules as a "driving moral authority for a government's interference in the
38 MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 2, at 187.
31 Jeffrey L. Harrison, Piercing Pareto Superiority: Real People and the
Obligations ofLegal Theory, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 1, 11 n.5 1.
40 Id.
41 Cotter, supra note 32, at 2105.
42 Id.
43 This is called the "tax and transfer" method. See id.
44 Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Unified Theory ofJustice:
The Integration ofFairness into Efficiency, 73 WASH. L. REv. 249, 292 (1998).
41 See id.
46 Id.
47 Td.
48 Id.
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lives of its citizens fails to recognize the still valid, invisible hand of
laissez-faire economics. ' ' 9 It is still true that "people are generally better
off overall when they are allowed to seek and maximize their preferences
in an open marketplace, and government interference is confinedto making
the marketplace more efficient."5 °
II. THE MAN 0 WAR DECISION
Man 0 War Restaurants, Inc. ("MOWR"), a closely held corporation,
was formed on February 23, 1989.51 At the organizational meeting, John E.
Martin, Jr., along with three other men, became the shareholders, officers
and directors of MOWR. 2 Each member of MOWR agreed to purchase
twenty-five percent of the corporation (100 shares) for a purchase price of
$1000.11 The corporation owned a Sizzler franchise restaurant located in
Lexington, Kentucky.54 On March 1, 1989, MOWR entered into an
employment agreement with Martin in which Martin was to serve as the
general manager of MOWR's Sizzler restaurant. The employment
agreement was a five-year contract and provided Martin with a salary of
$27,000 per year on top of his monthly dividends as a shareholder. 55
In addition, the employment contract entered into by the two parties
included a stock repurchase provision.56 This provision provided MOWR
with the ability to "buyback' Martin's stock for the amount he paid,
without interest, if his employment was terminated during the five-year
term. 7 The terms of the employment contract authorized the board of
directors to terminate Martin's employment for any reasonable cause.58
During Martin's employment as general manager of MOWR's Sizzler
restaurant, Martin continuously failed to perform his managerial duties in
49Id. at 291.
0Id. at 291-92 (citing ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Kathryn
Sutherland ed., 1993) (1776)).
11 See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Temporary
Injunction (Feb. 8, 1992) (Fayette Circuit Court) (Case no. 92-CI-0447).
52 See Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Partial
Summary Declaratory Judgment (July 7, 1992) (Fayette Circuit Court) (Case no.
92-CI-0447).53 See id.
' See id.
'5 See id.56 SeeMan 0 War Restaurants, Inc. v. Martin, 932 S.W.2d 366,367 (Ky. 1996).
57 See id.
58 See id.
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accordance with the standards established by the franchiser, Sizzler
Restaurants International, Inc. 9 Consequently, on January 17, 1992,
MOWR's board of directors voted to terminate Martin's employment.'
Thereafter, the president of MOWR requested that Martin surrender his
stock certificate to the corporation as required by the employment
agreement. However, Martin refused to turn over his MOWR stock.6
Because the employment agreement gave Martin the right to s611 or
transfer his MOWR stock to a third party who was not subject to the terms
of the agreement, MOWR was forced to file suit in order to protect itself.62
MOWR filed an action for a declaration of rights in the Fayette County
Circuit Court on February 5, 1992.63
The central issue in Man 0 War was the enforceability of the contract
provision by which Martin, a corporate shareholder and employee of
MOWR, was required upon termination of his employment to return his
stock for the sum he originally paid. The provision in question provided:
If Employee owns stock in Employer and this Agreement is terminated
under paragraph 9 hereof6 or by the voluntary action of Employee, then
Employee shall tender to Employer for purchase by it all of his stock in
Employer, the purchase price of which stock shall be a return of the
consideration paid by Employee for such stock, without interest.6
5
The trial court held for MOWR, enforcing "the contract provision on
grounds that the parties enjoyed broad freedom of contract and that no bad
faith was shown in process oftermination of the employment." In a bench
decision, the trial judge stated that "[w]hen grown men have seen fit to
place as a requirement in the contract without condition, qualification or
19 See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Partial
Summary Declaratory Judgment (July 7, 1992) (Fayette Circuit Court) (Case no.
92-CI-0447).
6 See id.
61 See id.
62See id.
63See Complaint (Feb. 5, 1992) (Fayette Circuit Court) (Case no. 92-CI-0447).
4Paragraph 9 provided a list of reasons why the Employer may terminate the
employment agreement, including termination for any other cause reasonably
determined by the Board of Directors. See Man 0 War Restaurant, Inc. Employ-
ment and Non-Competition Agreement (Mar. 1, 1989) (Fayette Circuit Court)
(Case no. 92-CI-0447).651d. 11.
'Man 0 War Restaurants, Inc. v. Martin, 932 S.W.2d 366,367 (Ky. 1996).
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provision against unforeseen circumstances, I do not feel a Court should
modify it."'67
On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "the
stock return provision of the Agreement operated as a forfeiture or penalty
for breach of a contract and, therefore, is unenforceable." 8 Here, the court
found that the provision forced Martin to forfeit the appreciation of the
MOWR stock. The court reasoned that "[e]quity detests forfeiture
provisions and frequently will find them unenforceable." 9 Consequently,
the court would not enforce the repurchase provision of the employment
contract. This forced MOWR to petition the Kentucky Supreme Court for
reversal.
However, the supreme court adopted the court of appeals' position,
holding that the court felt "compelled by principles of equity and fair-
dealing"'7 to invalidate the contract provision. The court decided that the
contract was flawed because of "its failure to recognize that upon transfer
of the stock to Martin, he held it independently of his status as an
employee."71 If the contract had provided Martin with compensation for the
appreciation of the stock, the provision would not have amounted to
forfeiture. Accordingly, the court concluded that when the shares of
MOWR were transferred to Martin, the stock "became his property and
strong public policy against forfeiture protects property from being taken
without appropriate compensation."' 2
In the court's view, "[a] corporation and its shareholders are allowed
to contract for a re-purchase or 'buyback' right ' "n only if "[t]he exercise of
such a right requires that a valuation be placed on the stock."'74 However,
by its decision, the court implied that only certain valuations will meet with
its approval.75 It held that. "[a]l accepted valuation methods take into
consideration the corporation's fiscal performance as well as its current
67 Judge James E. Keller, Bench Decision (Mar. 30, 1992) (Fayette Circuit
Court) (Case no. 92-CI-0447).6 Man 0 War, 932 S.W.2d at 368.
691 Id. (citing Sebastian v. Floyd, 585 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1979); C.I.T. Corp. v.
Thompson, 169 S.W.2d 820 (Ky. 1943)).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 369.
7 Id.
73 Id. at 368 (citing ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 765 (1986); 18B AM.
JUR. 2D Corporations § 1965 (1985)).
74 Id. (citing ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 765 (1986)).
75 See id. at 368-69.
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financial condition,' 76 and it suggests that the valuation used by MOWR
and Martin amounts to "liquidated damages7 7 ... grossly disproportionate
to actual injury."' Consequently, the court held the repurchase agreement
unenforceable because the valuation established requires Martin to forfeit
his equity in the stock.79
1II. STOCK REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS
Agreements like the one inMan 0 War, whereby the corporation orthe
remaining shareholders are given an option to repurchase stock that was
issued to an employee upon the occurrence of designated contingencies, are
utilized by many corporations. These agreements that restrict the transfer
of shares have proven most valuable in the closely held corporation setting.
These provisions, which require an employee shareholder to sell back
stock upon severance from corporate employment, are designed to ensure
that ownership of all of the stock, especially of a close corporation, stays
within the control of the remaining corporate owners-employees; that is,
those who will continue to contribute to its successes or failures.80
Statutes codifying the existence of these agreements and court opinions
upholding their validity recognize the prevalence ofthese agreements in the
corporate arena.
A. Statutory Law
The Kentucky Revised Statutes address the close corporation's need to
restrict the transferability of corporate stock in Chapter 271B Subtitle 6-
270. This statute, which mirrors the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act,$' provides that "an agreement among shareholders, or an agreement
76 Id. at 368 (citing 18A AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 702 (1985)).
' An amount contractually stipulated as a reasonable estimation of actual
damages to be recovered by one party if the other party breaches. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 164 (pocket ed. 1996).
71 Man 0 War, 932 S.W.2d at 369 (citing Mattingly Bridge Co. v. Holloway &
Son Constr. Co., 694 S.W.2d 702 (Ky. 1985)).79 See id.
10 Gallagher v. Lambert, 549 N.E.2d 136, 137 (N.Y. 1989).
81 REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.27 (1984).
Section 6.27, entitled "Restriction on Transfer of Shares and Other
Securities," provides:
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between shareholders and the corporation may impose restrictions on the
transfer... of shares of the corporation 8 2 as long as the restriction is valid,
enforceable, and authorized by statute.83 The condition of consequence for
validity and enforceability is that the holder of the shares or the transferee
to the shares must have actual knowledge of the restriction or the existence
of the restriction must be noted conspicuously on the front or back of the
stock certificate.84 As to the authorization of a restriction, Kentucky
(a) The articles of incorporations, bylaws, an agreement among
shareholders, or an agreementbetween shareholders and the corporation
may impose restrictions on the transfer or registration of transfer of
shares of the corporation. A restriction does not affect shares issued
before the restriction was adopted unless the holders of the shares are
parties to the restriction agreement or voted in favor of the restriction.
(b) A restriction on the transfer or registration of transfer of shares is
valid and enforceable against the holder or a transferee of the holder if
the restriction is authorized by this section and its existence is noted
conspicuously on the front or back of the certificate or is contained in
the information statement required by section 6.26(b). Unless so noted,
a restriction is not enforceable against a person without knowledge of
the restriction.
(c) A restriction on the transfer or registration of transfer of shares is
authorized:
(1) to maintain the corporation's status when it is dependent on the
number or identity of its shareholders;
(2) to preserve exemptions under federal or state securities law;
(3) for any other reasonable purpose.
(d) A restriction on the transfer or registration of transfer of shares may:
(1) obligate the shareholder first to offer the corporation or other
persons (separately, consecutively, or simultaneously) an opportunity
to acquire the restricted shares;
(2) obligate the corporation or other persons (separately, consecu-
tively, or simultaneously) to acquire the restricted shares;
(3) require the corporation, the holders of any class of its shares, or
another person to approve the transfer of the restricted shares, if the
requirement is not manifestly unreasonable;
(4) prohibit the transfer of the restricted shares to designated persons
or classes ofpersons, if the prohibition is not manifestly unreasonable.
(e) For purposes of this section, "shares" includes a security convertible
into or carrying a right to subscribe for or acquire shares.
12 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.6-270(1) (Michie 1989).
See id. § 271B.6-270(2).
84 See id.
1999-2000]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Revised Statutes section 271B.6-270 establishes that "[a] restriction on the
transfer... of shares shall be authorized [flor any reasonable purpose."85
The promulgation of Kentucky Revised Statutes section 271B.6-270
acknowledges legislative acceptance of restrictions on the transferability
of stock shares and legitimizes the value these restrictive agreements play
in the continuation of corporate enterprise. Consequently, it is surprising
that the Man 0 War court abrogated the stock repurchase agreement
entered into by Martin and MOWR. Because Kentucky Revised Statutes
section 271B.6-270 merely requires the holder or the transferee to have
actual knowledge of the restriction or the restriction to be conspicuously
noted on the stock certificate for the restriction to be enforceable, it is
entirely logical to conclude that if the parties involved satisfy the statutory
requirement, the court may not set the restriction aside. In Man 0 War,
Martin, a shareholder and party to the repurchase agreement, never alleged
any unawareness of the restriction. Therefore, with statutory compliance,
there is no statutory basis for not enforcing the stock repurchase agreement.
B. Common Law
1. Kentucky Courts
Although the stock repurchase agreement at issue in Man 0 War is
described by the Kentucky Supreme Court as being one of "first impres-
sion in this jurisdiction,"86 situations dealing with repurchase agreements
have been before the courts of Kentucky in the past. 7 In fact, in 1953 the
court ruled on the enforceability of a seemingly unfair stock repurchase
agreement in Krebs v. McDonald.8 The repurchase agreement among the
stockholders stated:
[T]hat in the event either of us shall at any time quit his or her active
connection with the Southern Optical Company, voluntarily or involun-
tarily, or in the event of our death (in which event this agreement shall be
binding on ourheirs, personal representatives, and assigns) or in the event
any of us desire to sell, assign, or transfer any share of the said capital
85Id. § 271B.6-270(3)(c).
86Man 0 War Restaurants, Inc. v. Martin, 932 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Ky. 1996).
87See Taylor's Adm'r v. Taylor, 301 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1957); Avritt v.
O'Daniel, 689 S.W.2d 36 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (examining the enforceability of
shareholder stock repurchase agreements).88Krebs v. McDonald, 266 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. 1953).
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stock... then in any of-the said events, the remaining stockholders shall
have the option and right to purchase the same for a reasonable time at a
reasonable price, to be fixed by the stockholders .... 89
Consequently, when Clarence B, McDonald, shareholder and party to
the shareholder agreement died, his shares were subject to repurchase by
the remaining shareholders of the Southern Optical Company. The
repurchase price fixed by the shareholders was $100 per share while the
value of the stock was $218 per share.' Despite the apparent unfairness in
the disparity between these prices, the court enforced the repurchase
agreement. The Krebs court reasoned that since "Mr. McDonald was a
signer of [the shareholder] agreement and one of the architects of the
method ofevaluating the stock,"'9 he must have "consideredthe values thus
set to be reasonable."92 The stock price set by the shareholders "did not
sensitively reflect the fluctuations in real or actual value, but appeared to
be approximations accepted by all concerned as the proper values for the
purposes of the agreement." 3
It appears that the court favored the efficient result of the free market
transaction as opposed to the equitable solution of remaking the bargain
between the parties involved. The aperture between the two stock prices
was uncomfortable; however, the court stated that "[w]hile a precise
method of evaluating the stock might be desirable from our standpoint,
such restrictive agreements often allow a lot of leeway." Moreover, the
possible effects on economic performance presented by this decision did
not escape the Krebs court. The court justified the repurchase price as
appropriate because a "restrictive stock agreement is one of the devices
evolved for assuring the succession in interest of persons most likely to act
harmoniously with the other shareholders."95
Accordingly, when balancing the value of the restrictive agreement
against the stock valuation problem, the need to preserve the restrictive
agreement will outweigh the need to correct the apparent unfairness of the
repurchase price.
19Id. at 88-89.-
90 See id. at 88.
91 Id. at 89.
92 Id.
93Id.
9 Id.
95Id.
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In order to induce desired individuals into investing their capital in such
closely held corporations with the stock restrictions often imposed, the
price must be attractive as well as the prospects of future earnings. In a
service corporation such as the Southern Optical Company, the mainte-
nance of a harmonious personnel, as well as a skilled one, is admittedly
essential to the success of the business.96
Taking these factors into consideration, the court did "not find that
enforcement of the agreement at the valuation so established would be
inequitable and against conscience."97
2. Other Courts
A look at other judicial authority further reveals the deficiencies of the
Man 0 War decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc.98 enforced a stock repurchase provision that allowed Merrill
Lynch to repurchase its own stock from the executors of an employee
shareholder at book value.99 Although a subsequent public offering which
Merrill Lynch had been planning at the time of the repurchase increased the
stock value to three times the amount paid to the executors, the court held
the repurchase valid."° Other courts have also enforced repurchase
agreements even when the repurchase price was extremely low in relation
to the fair market value of the stock at the time the repurchase option was
triggered.
For example, in Georesearch v. Morriss,' the United States District
Court for the Western District of Louisiana enforced a stock repurchase
provision that set the buyback price at a fixed rate. In 1955, Herbert
Morriss and George Howard, the president andvice president, respectively,
of Georesearch, Inc., sought additional capital to finance their operations
96 Id.
971 Id. at 90.
98 St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562
F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1977).
9 See id. at 1043. "'Book value' refers to assets, calculated as actual cost less
allowances for any depreciation. Book value may be more or less than current
market value." DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS TERMS, supra note 17, at 59.
'oo See St. Louis Union Trust Co., 562 F.2d at 1043.
101 Georesearch v. Morriss, 193 F. Supp. 163 (W.D. La. 1961), aff'd, 298 F.2d
442 (5th Cir. 1962).
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through a merger with J-0 Oil Company, a joint venture" of Oil and Gas
Property Management and Justiss-Mears. Through this transaction,
Georesearch became a wholly-owned subsidiary"03 of3-O Oil, and Morriss
and Howard became employees of J-O Oil.' ° The stock repurchase
provision was part of the employment agreements negotiated between the
new Georesearch and Morriss and Howard. Like the repurchase provision
in Man 0 War, the repurchase provision in Georesearch was triggered by
termination of employment. The provision gave the employer the right to
purchase one-half of the employee's stock in the corporation at $0.07 per
share. 05
At the time the agreement was entered into, the shares Morriss and
Howard received had a par value"° of $1.00 per share.107 Less than two
years after this agreement, Morriss and Howard were terminated and
Georesearch sued for enforcement ofthe buybackprovision. 0 1 Morriss and
Howard argued that "the obligation to sell one half of their shares at $0.07
a share [was] excessive,"'" but the court held that the repurchase provision
was enforceable despite the discrepancy between the fair market value and
the repurchase price." 0 The court reasoned that "the true cause of the
Agreement was to enable [Morriss and Howard] to receive an opportu-
nity-an opportunity to ... obtain capital with which to explore for oil and
gas."I1
By upholding the terms ofthe repurchase provision, the court promoted
efficiency. Morriss and Howard acted as rational maximizers when they
" The term "joint venture" refers to an "agreement by two or more parties to
work on a project together. Ajoint venture, which is usually limited to one project,
differs from a partnership, which forms the basis for cooperation on many
projects." DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS TERMS, supra note 17, at 308.
3 A wholly-owned subsidiary is a company whose voting stock is 100%
owned by another company, with the wholly-owned subsidiary company becoming
part of the other company. Cf id. at 559 (defining "subsidiary company" as a
"company whose voting stock is more than 50 percent owned by another firm. A
subsidiary company is part of another company.").
" See Georesearch, 193 F. Supp. at 166.
'
05 See id. at 164.
'06 "Par value" refers to "stated or face value of a stock or bond. It has little
significance for common stock." DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS TERMS, supra note 17,
at 418.
'
7 See Georesearch, 193 F. Supp. at 166.
lo' See id. at 164.
09 Id. at 170.
10 See id. at 180.
' Id. at 172.
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entered into the agreement with Georesearch. They acted in their self-
interest by rationally choosing the best means to their chosen ends, and by
so choosing, they maximizedtheirwealth inthat transaction. Consequently,
allowing the provision to stand as it was originally bargained, the court
recognized that it is more efficient for the law not to interfere with the
economics of this transaction.
Likewise, in State ex rel. Howeth v. Davidson & Co.,"' the Supreme
Court of Montana examined the enforceability of a stock repurchase
provision executed between an employer and its employee that required the
employee to sell the employer its stock back at fifty percent of the book
value upon the employee's termination."' In this case, D.A. Davidson &
Company, a closely held corporation, employed James R. Howeth. As an
employee, Howeth was allowed to purchase sixty shares of the corporation
at a fifty percent discount from the book value. The shares purchased by
Howeth were subject to a restriction that gave Davidson & Co. an option
to buy back the shares at fifty percent of the book value upon the termina-
tion of Howeth's employment.'
When Davidson & Co. sought to enforce this provision, Howeth
refused the request and argued that "forced sale of his stock at fifty percent
of book value [was] a harsh forfeiture from which [the court] should grant
him relief."'1 s Emphasizing that Howeth had agreed to the terms of the
provision when he signed the repurchase agreement, the court specifically
held that forced sale of Howeth's stock at fifty percent of book value was
not a harsh forfeiture."6 Here again, this court valued efficiency over
equity. Howeth acted as a rational maximizer when he bargained for the
Davidson stock with the knowledge that the stock was subject to the
repurchase agreement. Realizing the efficiency behind the transaction, the
court logically refused to set the agreement aside based on a theory of
forfeiture.
It is apparent that the courts in St. Louis Union Trust Co., Georesearch,
and Howeth felt secure in limiting their role. They refused to nullify
agreements that were freely negotiated by consenting parties. By limiting
their paternalistic instincts, they allowed the behavior of individuals in our
mixed-market economy to govern their undertakings, thereby maintaining
the natural efficiency of market transactions.
12 State ex rel. Howeth v. Davidson & Co., 517 P.2d 722 (Mont. 1973).
11 See id. at 724.
1 4 See id.
115 Id. at 730.
"16 See id.
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This same economic reasoning is prevalent throughout the decision in
Gallagher v. Lambert.17 James Gallagher was employed by Eastdil Realty
as an officer and director. As an executive, Gallagher was allowed to
"purchase [Eastdil] stock subjectto amandatorybuy-backprovision, which
provided that upon 'voluntary resignation or other termination' prior to
January 31, 1985, [he] would be required to return the stock for book
value.""1 8 Gallagher's employment with Eastdil was terminated on January
10, 1985, three weeks prior to the provision's cutoff date, which would
have increased the buyback price.' 19
Had Gallagher been fired after January 31, 1985, he would have
realized the full value of his shares, since the post-cutoff date "formula for
the buyback price was keyed to the company's earnings."'2 0 Despite the
seeming unfairness of the termination, the court enforced the provision.
The court explained its decision by stating that:
[t]he parties negotiated a written contract containing a common and plain
buy-back provision. [Gallagher] got what he bargained for .... There
being no basis presented for the courts to interfere with the operation and
consequences of this agreement between the parties, the order of the
AppellateDivision granting summary judgment to defendants, dismissing
the first three causes of action, should be affirmed... ."
Clearly, the court recognized the efficiency of allowing the parties to
rationally maximize their outcome in the transaction by freely bargaining
and establishing ex ante expectations.
Furthermore, the court held that stock buyback provisions "should not
be undone simply upon an allegation of unfaimess."" Rather, the court's
decision to enforce the buyback provision was based on the "application of
fundamental contractual principles to the plain terms in the parties' own
stock repurchase agreement."'2 Underscoring the court's decision were the
law and economic principles of efficiency and wealth maximization. The
court redsoned that allowing fairness to trump efficiency would "frustrate
the agreement and would be disruptive of the settled principles governing
... Gallagher v. Lambert, 549 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1989).
118 Id.
119 See id.
12 0 Id. at 136-37.
12 Id. at 137.
' Id. at 138.
2 Id.
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like agreements where parties contract between themselves in advance so
that there may be reliance, predictability and definiteness between
themselves on such matters."'
24
The economics at work in this decision are unmistakable. The court
refused to alter the law in a way that would encourage inefficiency in
market transactions and ultimately have a negative effect on economic
performance. Its decision was predicated on the rational behavior of the
parties during the transaction and the realization that it is not the
responsibility of the decision maker to make a better deal after the fact for
someone who made a bad bargain. This is especially true where ex post
bargaining would create an inefficient rule.
Moreover, decision makers who fashion rules that facilitate efficiency
and take advantage of free market dynamics will capture the essence of law
and economics. This paradigm was precisely applied by the New York
Court of Appeals in Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp.2 Faced with a stock
repurchase agreement that gave a corporation the right to purchase a
deceased shareholder's stock at the price the shareholder originally paid,
the court held the restriction to be reasonable and valid.'26
The court enforced the agreement despite the inequity of requiring the
shareholder to sell his stock back to the corporation for the same price at
which he bought it and ultimately forfeiting any appreciation in value. In
a case identical to Man 0 War, the Allen court reasoned that "the validity
of the restriction on transfer does not rest on any abstract notion of intrinsic
fairness of price"'27 because "[t]o be invalid, more than mere disparity
between option price and current value of the stock must be shown."'2
Repurchase agreements act as a "pre-emptive right through which
[shareholders] may, if they choose, veto the admission of a new partici-
pant."' 29 The economy that these ex ante agreements provide is absolutely
clear. Consequently, to remake the bargain in order to rid the agreement of
unreasonableness or unfairness would dissolve that economy. In fact, the
Allen court stated that "[c]arried to its logical conclusion, such a rationale
would permit, indeed would encourage, expensive litigation in every case
where the price specified in the restriction, or formula for fixing the price,
was other than a recognized and easily ascertainable fair market value."'3 °
124 Id.
" Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 141 N.E.2d 812 (N.Y. 1957).
126 see id.
127 Id. at 817.
12 Id.
1291 Id. at 816-17.
"o Id. at 816.
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As the majority of closely held corporations do not trade on a public
market,' 3 ' the valuation of a close corporation's stock is an internal matter
best determined by the corporation's insiders. In Man 0 War, the insiders
agreed to a price formula that economic theory tells us enabled the parties
to reach their desired objectives in this particular market transaction. Thus,
efficiency was achieved, and decision makers should not disturb the result.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MAN 0 WAR DECISION
By choosing equity as the valued social goal, the Man 0 War court was
determined to focus on the unfairness of denying Martin, the beneficial
owner of the stock, the benefit of the stock's appreciation. However, by
using equity as its baseline, the court ignored the economics of the free
market transaction.
Acting as rational maximizers, MOWR and Martin reached an
agreement that provided the means to achieving their desired ends. A look
at the free market transaction process reveals a two-step approach, which
was clearly followed by Man 0 War and Allen. In the first step, the parties
discover "a potential exchange that will increase the well-being of both
parties."'32 Being comprisedofonly four shareholders, MOWRwas simply
protecting itself against unwanted share distribution. Martin was interested
in employment and the income associated with that employment, and
MOWR was interested in Martin's services. Therefore, the two parties
bargained in order to increase their respective well-being.
In the second step, the parties determine "what will be viewed by both
parties as a way to fairly divide the gain from the exchange."'3 MOWR
anticipated profiting from Martin's skills and was willing to divide its gain
with Martin. Likewise, Martin anticipated profiting from the employment
provided by MOWR and was willing to divide his gain with MOWR.
From this perspective, an economic analysis of the Man 0 War
decision reveals its want of efficiency. Economic analysis focuses on the
ex ante rather than ex post perspective and the idea that "[r]ational people
base their decisions on their expectations of the future rather than on their
regrets about the past."'34 The ex ante bargaining in which MOWR and
Martin engaged provided the basis for their expectations. Based on legal
precedent concerning closely held corporations' ability to restrict the
"' See DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS TERMS, supra note 17, at 95.
132 Harrison, supra note 39, at 4.
133 Id.
134 POSNER, supra note 28, at 8.
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transferability of their stock,'l3 MOWR reasonably believed that the
contract would be entirely enforceable.
In addition, Martin had no reason to believe that the entire contract
would not be enforceable. The two parties priced the bargain at the outset,
taking into account past performance and future contingencies. Therefore,
setting the stockrepurchase provision aside amounted to an evisceration of
the parties' expectations and altered economic performance because "[i]f
a party for whom a contract to which he freely agreed turns out badly is
allowed to revise the terms of the contract ex post, few contracts will be
made." 136
A. Economic Performance
Currently, Kentucky's economy is strong, as the entire United States
continues to experience a long period of prosperity brought on by low
interest rates, low unemployment, and a bull market on Wall Street.
Economic forecasters predict "Kentucky's annual total employment growth
rate... to exceed the national growth rate by 0.5 percent on average from
1998 through 2000."13 7 That equates to "26,000 additional jobs for
Kentucky over the three year period."'38 Indeed, employers are drawn to
Kentucky. In the period "from January 1993 to August 1998, 3,400
companies announced investments of more than $13 billion, with a
commitment to create nearly 126,000 jobs for Kentuckians."'139
Kentucky's appeal is that it "offers great advantages for new and
expanding businesses, including a great location, low utility rates, low
taxes and a pro-business government.""' In addition, Kentucky has moved
"away from just being driven by tobacco and coal and become a much
more diverse state.' 4' Kentucky now has employers in distribution,
manufacturing, and white-collar industries that combine to provide a better
balance of job opportunities.4 This diversity and flexibility has the
'3s See supra Part I.
'
36 POSNER, supra note 28, at 8.
137 Eric C. Thompson, Highlights of the University ofKentucky's Annual Eco-
nomic Report, LANE REP., Jan. 1, 1998, at 29.
138 Id.
139 Marvin E. Strong, Jr., Kentucky Does More Than Recruit Factories,
HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Oct. 4, 1998, at F2.
140 Id.
'4, Adam Burns, Corporate Bait: LuringBusiness to the Bluegrass, LANE REP.,
July 1, 1998, at 32, 33.
'
42 See id.
[V OL. 88
MAN O WAR RESTAUR NTS, INC. V. MARTIv
potential to stimulate wealth-maximizing market transactions and hence,
a greater gain for everyone. Consequently, these developments have
Kentucky economically well-positioned for the twenty-first century.
B. Altering Economic Performance
Although the Man 0 War decision may potentially reach beyond
Kentucky, and its scope ultimately broadened to include more than
repurchase agreements, its implications will be felt first by the Kentucky
economy. While Kentucky enjoys current economic prosperity and
continues to push for more employers, the Man 0 War decision and its
underlying logic may prove to be a pitfall with the potential to stall, and
eventually recess, economic performance throughout Kentucky.
The Man 0 War decision unbalances the current state of the law and
exposes the judicial system to an explosion of litigation. Because stock
repurchase provisions are well accepted ways for closely held corporations
to protect their going concern, 43 the Man 0 War decision places all of the
existing agreements in doubt. Did the corporation use the correct valuation
method? Is the result fair to the shareholder? Should the court remake the
bargain? These are questions that now have no certain answer.
The phenomenon of increased litigation was specifically addressed by
the Allen court when it refused to strike down a set value for stock in a
repurchase agreement as unfair or unreasonable.'" Certainly, the logic
behind the Man 0 War decision will "permit, indeed, would encourage,
expensive litigation in every case where the price specified in the restric-
tion, or formula for fixing the price, was other than a recognized and easily
ascertainable fair market value."'4 5
In addition, as employers are alerted to the change Man 0 War has
made in the law, they will inevitably be discouraged from establishing their
businesses in Kentucky. The prospect of the judicial system remaking a
corporation's contracts after the fact will detract from the competitive
advantages Kentucky presents. In effect, the Man 0 War decision has
removed the incentives associated with free market transactions, eliminat-
ing Kentucky's ability to compete for employers and changing the way
Kentucky does business.
The reality of this situation is altered economic performance. The
"governmental regulation of corporations and other business entities,
14 3 See supra Part III.
'"See supra Part III.B.2.
Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 141 N.E.2d 812, 816 (N.Y. 1957).
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including rules governing owners, managers and third parties, is inappro-
priate except to the extent that such regulation may, in rare circumstances,
provide the most efficient rule."'1 When the most efficient rule is not
provided, incentives to exchange are altered, then human behavior is
altered, and consequently, the economic performance of the economy is
altered.
C. Corrective Measures
It has been said that "[t]he single most important contribution that law
and economics has made to the law is the use of a coherent theory of
human decision-making ('rational choice theory') to examine how people
are likely to respond to legal rules." 147 Operating from this position, "the
goal of law under a purely economic theory becomes the creation of rules
which decrease transaction costs, so that parties may, as nearly as possible,
achieve efficient solutions to their problems."'48
Applying economics to the law, decision makers will understand that
"people who make a transaction-thus putting their money where their
mouths are-ordinarily are more trustworthy judges of their self-interest
than a judge (or jury), who has neither a personal stake in nor first-hand
acquaintance with the venture on which the parties embarked when they
signed the contract." 49 Decision makers should realize that changing the
law changes incentives and ultimately alters economic performance.5 0 In
addition, decision makers should know that ifprovided with efficient rules,
humans, as rational maximizers, would choose the best means to their
chosen ends, thereby increasing the aggregate wealth of society.'5 '
Conversely, decision makers should know that if they provide merely
equitable rules, humans would have a disincentive to exchange, which will
negatively alter economic performance.5 2 Therefore, "if the goal.., is to
promote efficiency... enforcing the parties' agreement insofar as it can be
ascertained may be a more efficient method of attaining this goal than
rejecting the agreement when it appears to be inefficient.' 53
146 Downs, supra note 3, at 11 (discussing the arguments of FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK&DANIELR. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW viii (1991)).
'
47 Ulen, supra note 8, at 436.
148 Downs, supra note 3, at 13.
149 POSNER, supra note 28, at 93.
1'0 See supra Part I.A.
... See supra Part I.C.-D.
152 See supra Part I.C.-D.
153 POSNER, supra note 28, at 93.
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CONCLUSION
The weight of authority supports the principle that when the holder or
transferee ofstockknows ofthe restriction ontransferability, the restriction
will be enforced just as the parties agreed.'" By refusing to enforce a stock
repurchase agreement that restrictedthe transfer of stockbecause it was not
fair, Man 0 War stands on its own and changes the current state of the law
An economic analysis of the Man 0 War decision reveals its deficien-
cies and illustrates the need for rules that promote efficiency to take
advantage of free market transactions. From a law and economics
perspective, the change that Man 0 War presents can potentially affect
future market transactions, including stock repurchase agreements, by
altering transaction incentives. Once the incentives to exchange are altered,
human behavior will change, ultimately causing a change in economic
performance. Thus, Man 0 War is law altering economic performance.
,5 See supra Part lI.B.2.
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